Core and Peripheral Voters:Predictors of Turnout Across Three Types of Elections by Bhatti, Yosef et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Core and Peripheral Voters
Predictors of Turnout Across Three Types of Elections
Bhatti, Yosef; Dahlgaard, Jens Olav; Hansen, Jonas Hedegaard; Hansen, Kasper M.
Published in:
Political Studies
DOI:
10.1177/0032321718766246
Publication date:
2019
Document version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (APA):
Bhatti, Y., Dahlgaard, J. O., Hansen, J. H., & Hansen, K. M. (2019). Core and Peripheral Voters: Predictors of
Turnout Across Three Types of Elections. Political Studies, 67(2), 348-366. [5].
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321718766246
Download date: 09. Oct. 2020
Core and Peripheral Voters: Predictors of Turnout across Three Types of Elections 
 
Yosef Bhatti**, Jens Olav Dahlgaard***, Jonas Hedegaard Hansen* & Kasper M. Hansen* 
*University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science, 
Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark  
**VIVE–Danish Centre of Applied Social Science, Herluf Trolles Gade 11, 1052 Copenhagen K 
*** Assistant Professor at the Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business 
E-mail: yobh@vive.dk, jod.dbp@cbs.dk, jhh@ifs.ku.dk & kmh@ifs.ku.dk,www.kaspermhansen.eu 
PREPRINT. Accepted for publication in Political Studies 
February, 2018 
Abstract 
Citizens who abstain from voting in consecutive elections and inequality in turnout in democratic 
elections constitute a challenge to the legitimacy of democracy. Applying the law of dispersion, 
which stipulates higher levels of turnout and higher levels of equality in turnout are positively 
related, we study turnout patterns across different types of elections in Denmark, a high-turnout 
European context. Across three different elections with turnout rates from 56.3 to 85.9 percent, we 
use a rich, nationwide panel dataset of 2.1 million citizens with validated turnout and high-quality 
sociodemographic variables. Nine percent of the citizens are abstainers in the three consecutive 
elections, and these are disproportionately male, of non-Western ethnic background, with little 
education, and with low income. The law of dispersion finds support as inequalities in turnout 
increase when turnout decreases and vice versa. Furthermore, municipalities with lower turnout 
have higher inequalities in participation than high-turnout municipalities in local elections. 
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When the projected turnout for the European Parliament election in 2014 was announced to be 43.1 
percent, a small increase from 43 percent in 2009, the liberal leader Guy Verhofstadt said, “The 
European Parliament will be more representative than the previous one” (Euractiv 2014). While 
the final vote count showed that turnout was, in fact, 42.6 percent, a small decline from 2009, Mr. 
Verhofstadt’s focus on representativeness is in line with concerns expressed by many European 
leaders. Not only political leaders have this focus. Indeed, studying inequalities in political 
participation, and particularly voter turnout, remains a central topic in political science. 
Participatory equality is often mentioned as a core democratic ideal (Lijphart 1997; Wolfinger & 
Rosenstone 1980). If some groups disproportionately abstain from voting, it may have important 
consequences for democracy. These groups will have less influence on who is elected and become 
underrepresented by legislators (Martin 2003; Griffin & Newman 2005; Leighley & Nagler 2013) 
and, as a consequence, they might identify less with their representatives and mistrust them more 
(Mansbridge 1999). 
Aggregate turnout varies substantially across different types of elections. European countries 
experience higher turnout rates in national elections than in local and European elections (Blais 
2000: 37; Morlan 1984; Reif & Schmitt 1980; IDEA 2016). Strong variation across elections is not 
unique to Europe. In the US, turnout surges for presidential elections and declines when midterm 
elections take place (Campbell 1987; McDonald 2016). While turnout studies often examine 
differences between voters and abstainers in individual elections (e.g., Sigelman et al. 1985: 749), 
only little empirical attention has been given to the variation in the predictors of voting across 
elections (e.g., Persson et al. 2013; Nawara 2016). Do the same sociodemographic factors explain 
the variation in turnout when turnout is 43 percent as when turnout is 65 percent (i.e., the national 
election turnout average among EU-member states in 2014, IDEA 2016) and with the same 
strength? We use validated turnout and register data for more than 2 million citizens who were all 
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eligible to vote in three Danish elections at, respectively, the local, European, and national levels 
from 2013 to 2015. In the three elections, turnout ranged from 56.3 to 85.9 percent. The turnout 
data from the elections are merged with administrative data at the individual level, which contains 
hundreds of highly reliable sociodemographic variables. This allows us to analyze the predictors of 
cumulative voting, the total number of votes cast in a number of consecutive elections, in a high-
turnout context and the potential differential drop-off of voters across different types of elections. 
As we rely on a large administrative, individual-level dataset with validated turnout and reliable 
covariates in different types of elections, we overcome well-known problems of self-reported voting 
and small survey samples which have characterized much of the previous literature (Smets & Van 
Ham 2013; Karp & Brockington 2005; Bernstein et al. 2001; Dahlgaard et al. 2018). 
Studies that examine multiple elections often look at cumulative turnout based on citizens’ 
history of voting in one type of election (Campbell 1960; Ansolabehere & Schaffner 2016; Sciarini 
et al. 2015; Sigelman et al. 1985; Sigelman & Jewell 1986). In the first part of our analysis, we look 
at cumulative turnout across three consecutive elections and thus move beyond the vote/not vote 
variable in a single election. Consequently, we will learn about those who selectively vote in some 
elections and not in others. We also learn about the abstainers who seem permanently disconnected 
from the elections under investigation.  
To understand these inequalities in turnout further, we apply the law of dispersion, which states 
that higher general levels of turnout come with higher levels of equality in political participation 
(Tingsten 1937; Lijphart 1997). We take the analysis one step further and investigate explicitly the 
variation in turnout inequalities across different types of elections. Despite the prominence of the 
law of dispersion, only few studies have empirically investigated it, and recent empirical 
contributions show mixed results as Persson et al. (2013) finds overall support for the law of 
dispersion, while Sinnott & Achen (2008) finds no support regarding social class and the law of 
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dispersion. Across the three types of elections, we explore whether the difference in turnout 
between different sociodemographic groups increases when fewer turn out to vote.  
We find substantial inequalities in cumulative turnout. Across the three elections, 9.3 percent of 
the voters, the abstainers, failed to cast even a single vote while 51.2 percent of the voters, the core 
voters, voted in all three elections. Notably, the European elections were almost only for the core 
voters. Only 6.4 percent of the voters cast a vote in the European election but failed to do so in at 
least one of the other elections. Core voters and abstainers are far from representative of the voters. 
Core voters are more likely to be female, better educated, and earn higher incomes. They also tend 
to be older than abstainers, and they are less likely to have a native background. Together, these 
findings show that the law of dispersion also applies when studying cumulative participation. 
We also find evidence supporting the law of dispersion when comparing the individual 
elections. In low turnout elections, it is especially voters with no or little education who drop off. 
The differences in turnout across ethnicity also increase as voters of Western background are less 
behind ethnic Danes in local elections compared to national elections. Finally, we show that the 
turnout gap regarding education and ethnic background is negatively correlated with turnout in local 
elections across Danish municipalities. This indicates that inequalities follow the aggregate level of 
turnout, as predicted by the law of dispersion, and not just the type of election under investigation. 
 
Studying inequalities in turnout and the law of dispersion 
Inequalities in voter participation have been on political scientists’ agenda for decades. Scholars 
concerned with the well-being of representative democracy argue that large inequalities in turnout 
might pose a legitimacy problem for representative democracy as the opinions of the elected 
politicians become too much out of sync with the attitudes of the citizens (cf. Tingsten 1937: 184). 
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Furthermore, it is questionable whether the core idea of elections—to elect representatives for the 
people—can be said to be meaningfully met if inequalities in participation are too large (Lijphart 
1997; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). 
With such concerns in mind, empirical research has focused on determining who votes as well 
as what predicts and causes citizens’ turnout decision. Of particular relevance regarding inequalities 
in turnout is the degree to which some sociodemographic characteristics, such as ethnicity, age, 
gender, and education, predicts turnout. In the existing literature, a substantial amount of research 
has investigated questions like this in single elections or the same type of elections over time in a 
given country. In a meta-analysis of 95 published turnout studies from 2000-2010, Smets & Van 
Ham (2013) show that education, age, residential mobility, region, and turnout history consistently 
correlate with turnout at the national level. On the other hand, gender, ethnicity, employment, and 
citizenship correlate with turnout in some settings, but not consistently across studies (ibid.). 
While these findings are, indeed, useful, there are limitations. First, only 11 percent of the 
reported studies use validated turnout as the dependent measure (Smets & Van Ham 2013: 346). 
This leaves them vulnerable to well-known problems of over-reporting of self-reported turnout 
(Karp & Brockington 2005; Bernstein et al. 2001; Dahlgaard et al. 2018). Furthermore, most studies 
also use self-reported independent variables such as income and educational attainment, which can 
also be misreported (Hariri & Lassen 2017). This makes the actual relationship between turnout and 
sociodemographic characteristics even more uncertain. Second, and related, studies using validated 
turnout in a European context are very rare (cf. Smets & Van Ham 2013).1 Third, some factors are 
likely to be relevant in some contexts and not in others. Indeed, Smets and Van Ham (2013) restrict 
their sample to include only national elections based on the argument that some independent 
1 Although see Heath (2000) for an exception and new studies (e.g., Bhatti & Hansen 2012; Bhatti 
et al. 2016; Hansen 2016; Dahlgaard 2018). 
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variables might affect turnout differently in first-order elections compared to second-order elections 
(Smets & Van Ham 2013: 345; See also Fieldhouse et al. 2007). Therefore, we still lack knowledge 
about how different variables correlate with turnout across different types of elections but for the 
same individuals, which is at the core of the law of dispersion.  
The article’s first contribution is to fill this knowledge gap by investigating the characteristics 
of core and peripheral voters as well as the abstainers across elections.2 Specifically, we ask to what 
degree inequalities in participation exists across elections. By studying cumulative turnout, we shift 
the focus from the one-election, voted/abstained variable used in single election studies to 
participation in multiple consecutive elections. We define cumulative voting as the number of votes 
cast in three consecutive election.  
We can think of the electorate as being made up of a core that votes consistently in any 
election, a periphery that votes occasionally, and a group of abstainers who do not participate in 
elections (Sciarini et al. 2015; Ansolabehere & Schaffner 2016). The peripheral voters are less 
intrinsically interested in politics and know less about politics compared to the core voters (Nawara 
2016), and it requires more short-term stimulation such as dramatic issues or events, popular 
candidates on the ticket, or extensive campaigning to motivate the peripheral voters to participate in 
the election. The core voters, on the other hand, have sufficiently high levels of political interest to 
vote in elections, even when the level of political stimulation is relatively weak (Campbell 1960; 
Fieldhouse et al. 2007). The abstainers are the ones who fail to vote in three consecutive elections. 
They might simply be politically disengaged or have opted out of the political process. 
2 In this context, the concept of core and peripheral voters refers to frequency of voting, where core 
voters refer to the type of citizens who manage to vote no matter the type of election. The 
terminology was introduced by Campbell (1960) and has also been used by Sigelman and Jewell 
(1986) and, recently, by Ansolabehere & Schaffner (2016). 
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We are interested in measuring the proportion of the core and peripheral voters as well as the 
abstainers. On the one hand, if it is different citizens that abstain from election to election, we might 
be less concerned with the democratic legitimacy of the election as voters will in this sense accept 
the “social contract” of the election sooner or later. On the other hand, we might be more concerned 
about the health of representative democracy if it is the same citizens who repeatedly abstain from 
voting (Sciarini et al. 2015). For instance, research from Geneva, Switzerland, suggests that 
approximately 20 percent abstain from voting in 10 successive direct votes (Sciarini et al. 2015). In 
the US, around 37 percent failed to vote in four national elections (two midterms and two 
presidential) from 2006 to 2012, whereas 25 percent voted in all four elections (Ansolabehere & 
Schaffner 2016). How the levels are in the context of our study, a European country with a high 
turnout rate, is descriptively an important question.  
The article's second contribution is to apply the logic of the law of dispersion in an analysis of 
cumulative participation. The law of dispersion refers to the idea that inequalities in turnout 
increases when aggregate turnout declines (Tingsten 1937; Lijphart 1997; Rosenstone & Hansen 
1993; Persson et al. 2013). In this way, lower turnout equals larger inequalities in descriptive 
representation.3 While the scholarly focus primarily has been on comparing turnout inequalities in 
different types of elections, we extend the logic of the law of dispersion to an analysis of turnout 
inequalities across multiple elections of the same type. We do this by investigating the 
3 Empirical investigations of Tingsten’s law are rare, but some examples exist. Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) compare average midterm and presidential election turnout between 1952 and 1988 
for different subgroups and argue that Tingsten’s law of dispersion holds firm in a US context. 
Likewise, Persson et al. (2013) study the sociodemographic composition of the electorate in a 
Swedish county in a 2010 election and a re-election in 2011 and conclude that the inequalities in 
turnout do increase when turnout declines. Finally, Sinnott and Achen (2008) argue that the law of 
dispersion holds in Europe and US for most demographic categories, but that Lijphart’s (1997) 
focus on social classes is misguided.  
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sociodemographic characteristics of the different groups introduced above across almost a hundred 
municipal elections held simultaneously.  
It is especially important to investigate the characteristics of the abstainers, those disconnected 
from the electoral process. Furthermore, knowledge about the social profile of the groups can tell us 
whether the peripheral voters look mostly like the core voters or the abstainers. In the Swiss study, 
peripheral voters share most characteristics with the abstainers (Sciarini et al. 2015). In both the 
American and Swiss studies, older voters are more likely to be core voters (Ansolabehere & 
Schaffner 2016; Sciarini et al. 2015). Additionally, ethnic minorities are less likely to be consistent 
voters in the US context. In this article, we explore whether core and peripheral voters are also 
descriptively different in a high-turnout context. Compared with the previous studies, our article has 
the additional advantage of access to a rich set of sociodemographic variables none of which is self-
reported. In addition to the variables discussed above, we expect that citizens with higher levels of 
education are less likely to be abstainers; a pattern which has previously been documented in 
Denmark and single election studies in many other countries (cf. Smets & Van Ham 2013; Bhatti & 
Hansen 2012; Bhatti et al. 2016b; Persson 2015). 
The article’s third contribution is an analysis of the law of dispersion in the traditional way by 
analyzing the sociodemographic patterns in turnout in different types of elections. If some voter 
groups are more likely to drop off from the electorate than others in certain elections, we could see 
descriptive differences between the general electorate and those who exercise their right to vote. 
Perhaps differences in drop-off rates are non-monotonic, and some groups initially see the largest 
drop-off rates while other groups catch up in terms of drop-off if turnout falls even lower. In that 
case, we could imagine turnout to be descriptively more equal when turnout is, say, 50 percent 
instead of 70. Consequentially, whether differential levels of turnout increase or decrease 
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differences across groups, voter participation depends on what type of voters drop out of the 
electorate when turnout declines and at what point (Sinnott & Achen 2008). 
Furthermore, we could imagine different types of voters to drop off in different types of 
elections. For instance, we might imagine that highly educated, young citizens are likely to follow 
European politics more intensively and thereby be more likely to vote in low-salience European 
elections than young citizens with less education. At the same time, this group might be less 
invested in local government issues and thus be the first to drop off in local elections. Thus, we can 
imagine the aggregate turnout being the same in two different types of elections, but with widely 
different turnout across groups since different kinds of voters are less attracted to different kinds of 
elections. Whether this is the case is an empirical question, which we analyze in this article and 
thereby contribute with an analysis of the law of dispersion in a high-turnout context in three types 
of elections. 
 
Data and context: Three Danish elections from 2013-2015 
We use data from three Danish elections from 2013-2015, specifically the Danish municipality 
elections held in November 2013, the European elections in May 2014, and the parliamentary 
election held in June 2015. While Denmark has a high turnout compared to most other European 
countries, we note that the participation ratio between the national election and European 
parliamentary election in Denmark is around 3:2, which is similar to the participation ratio across 
27 EU countries.4 Thus, even though turnout in Denmark is generally high, the relative differences 
4 The ratio is calculated by dividing turnout at the latest national election by turnout at the European 
Parliament elections of 2014, based on figures from IDEA (IDEA International 2016). Missing data 
from Latvia explains why only 27 countries are included. Unfortunately, similar data for turnout in 
local elections are not available in a form that enables the same type of calculation. 
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in participation between elections are similar, which arguably makes the analysis even more useful 
for understanding turnout dynamics in other European countries.  
In Denmark, there is substantial variation when it comes to the saliency of the elections and the 
average participation levels over time. In table 1, we display turnout rates in the most recent of each 
type of election. National elections are called by the prime minister under the restriction that the 
election must be held within four years of the latest election. To vote, one must be at least 18 years 
old on Election Day, have Danish citizenship, be a permanent resident in the realm, and not be 
under guardianship. The national elections involve extensive campaigning and wall-to-wall 
coverage in most media outlets. The average turnout from 1970-2015 has been 86.3 percent In other 
words; the Danish national elections are highly salient. 
Table 1: Descriptive overview of the elections 
 Local 
2013 
European 
2014 
National  
2015 
Actual turnout (%) 71.9 56.3 85.9 
Eligible citizens (N) 4,409,251 4,141,329 4,145,105 
n in our sample 4,362,156 2,339,064 3,097,536 
Turnout in our sample (%) 71.9 56.5 85.8 
Turnout for panel part of sample (%, N=2,093,796) 74.8 57.5 86.3 
 
Local elections take place simultaneously in November every four years across all 98 Danish 
municipalities. The turnout has averaged approximately 70 percent over the last 40 years. Eligible 
to vote are those who can vote in the national elections, EU citizens and citizens from Norway and 
Iceland with a permanent residence in Denmark, and non-EU citizen with at least three consecutive 
years of permanent residency in the country before the election. They also must be 18 years of age 
and not be under guardianship. Consequentially, the number of eligible citizens is higher for local 
elections (cf. table 1). The municipalities play a key role in providing welfare services and decide 
on tax levels with some degree of autonomy. While they are less salient than national elections, the 
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local elections are still highly visible in the streets and media in the period running up to the 
election, and they are relatively high-salient in a comparative perspective.  
European elections draw the least attention of the three types of elections and are in a Danish 
context perceived as second-order elections (cf. Reif & Schmitt 1980; Schmitt 2005). There is less 
campaigning, and the media attention is less intense and of a shorter duration. The turnout has 
averaged around 50 percent, which still places the Danish turnout levels among the highest in the 
EU countries without compulsory voting. Overall, the European elections in Denmark can be 
categorized as a low to medium salient event. In the European elections, voters from EU countries 
who are 18 years of age and permanent residents in the country can vote if they are not under 
guardianship. 
All three elections follow proportional representational principles. All eligible voters are 
automatically registered to vote and receive a voting card approximately 10 days before the 
elections, and the logistic barriers for voting are quite low.5 
In our study, we use validated turnout that stems from the official voter lists. In Denmark, voter 
lists are usually destroyed shortly after the election. However, in 2013, 2014, and 2015 we received 
permission to collect the lists, and all municipalities were encouraged to send the lists in digital 
form to us. In case the lists were not digitized, the municipalities had to do this before delivering 
them to us. In 2013, all municipalities delivered the information, 61 municipalities delivered in 
2014, and 72 municipalities in 2015. Thus, we have an almost complete dataset for the 2013-
election, but somewhat incomplete datasets for the rest of the elections. The lack of turnout data is 
due mostly to some polling stations using manual voter lists and the municipalities not having 
5 Voters can cast an early vote up to three months ahead of the elections by going to a pre-election 
polling place, an option used by four to nine percent of the voters in the three elections (Bhatti et al. 
2016c). Citizens’ cannot use mail-in voting. 
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resources to digitize the lists in all elections. Early voters are also validated and correctly classified 
as having cast a vote. 
It is important to highlight that there was little room for self-selection in the study at the 
individual level. If voters were assigned a polling station that delivered turnout information to our 
research team, their turnout data would go into the study without further ado. However, when 
studying cumulative voting, we use only voters with complete voter records. As an implication, 
there will be voters who are excluded based on their moving patterns if they have moved from one 
municipality with recorded turnout in one election to one without turnout in another election. 
Likewise, some voters have had a moving pattern where had they not moved they would have been 
excluded because they had stayed in a municipality without recorded voter turnout. Compared to 
alternative ways of tracking voters these are very limited attrition problems. Survey investigations 
of multiple elections potentially suffer from the challenge of differential self-selection depending on 
the type of elections which makes the results from the various elections incomparable. In sum, even 
though the turnout data is incomplete, a large panel dataset without individual-level self-selection or 
self-reporting of either voting or any covariates is a leap forward for the turnout literature, and it is 
particularly important for empirical analysis of the law of dispersion. 
In our analysis, we focus on the panel part of the dataset. Consequentially, citizens who were 
not eligible to vote in one of the elections are removed from the dataset. In practice, this means that 
the minimum age in the dataset is approximately 19 years and seven months. Furthermore, due to 
the difference in eligibility, a group of non-Danish citizens who can vote in local elections, but not 
in national or European elections, are removed from the analysis. Since non-Danish citizens and 
young people turn out at quite low rates, removing them also explains why, in table 1, we see that 
turnout in the panel part is approximately three percentage points higher than the actual turnout in 
the local and the European elections. We also remove individuals who in at least one election lived 
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in a district that did not supply turnout information to the study. Finally, we remove citizens for 
whom we lack information about one of the independent variables that we are applying in the 
analysis (38,086 observations). Altogether, the dataset covers a unique individual-level register data 
on turnout and hundreds of sociodemographic variables for 2,093,796 citizens across the three 
elections. 
The turnout data are merged with administrative data from Statistics Denmark.6 All Danes have 
a unique civil registration number which in an anonymized form is used to link a wide range of 
variables from administrative records maintained by Statistics Denmark.  The data include variables 
that are often used in turnout studies, such as education, age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, and so 
forth. Since they are administratively collected, they are full population records without individual 
self-reporting. Our unique data quality further strengthens the empirical contribution to the 
understanding of individual-level turnout behavior in a European, relatively high-turnout context. 
 
  
6 The data is stored on servers at Statistics Denmark. Due to security and privacy reasons, the data 
cannot be made available on the Internet.  
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Analysis 
Cumulative turnout and inequality 
Table 2 presents an overview of the cumulative turnout across the three elections. 
Table 2: Voting patterns in three elections 
Voter type Local 
2013 
European 
2014 
National 
2015 
% N 
Abstainers Did not vote Did not vote Did not vote 9.3 194,484 
 Voted Did not vote Did not vote 2.7 55,528 
Peripheral Did not vote Voted Did not vote 0.6 12,168 
(1/3 votes) Did not vote Did not vote Voted 10.8 226,112 
 Voted Voted Did not vote 1.2 25,197 
Peripheral Voted Did not vote Voted 19.7 413,445 
(2/3 votes) Did not vote Voted Voted 4.6 95,567 
Core Voted Voted Voted 51.2 1,071,295 
Total    100  2,093,796 
 
Table 2 reveals considerable variation in turnout patterns. We see that 9.3 percent failed to 
vote in all three elections (row 1 in table 2), thereby being categorized as abstainers. At the other 
end, 51.2 percent voted in all three elections. These are categorized as core voters. This leaves 
around 40 percent, the peripheral voters, who vote in some, but not all, elections. Within this group, 
there is some noteworthy variation. For instance, approximately 14 percent voted in one election 
(rows 2-4 in table 2), and most of these participated in the national election. Likewise, 25.5 percent 
voted in two elections (rows 5-7 in table 2), again in most cases with one of the elections being the 
national election. The European elections are also revealed to be the least appealing in table 2. Only 
5.8 percent voted in the European elections but failed to do so in one of the other elections, and just 
0.6 percent voted in that election alone. Combined, only 6.4 percent of the voters participated in the 
European election without participating in at least one of the other elections. Finally, only 1.8 
percent voted in the European elections without voting in the national elections. In other words, it is 
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almost exclusively core voters who bother to vote in the European elections, and almost no one 
votes exclusively in those elections. 
Next, we look at the characteristics of the groups. In table 3, we present some descriptive 
demographics for the abstainers, the peripheral voters, and the core voters to highlight any 
inequalities in turnout across groups. We see substantial differences in the sociodemographic 
composition of the three groups. Non-Western voters comprise 12.4 percent of abstainers compared 
to 3.8 percent of all voters and only 1.3 percent of core voters. Even though there are more than five 
times as many core voters than abstainers, voters with a non-Western background are still more 
likely to be abstainers than core voters. This pertains even though only individuals with Danish 
citizenship are eligible to vote in national elections, meaning the group with a non-Western 
background in the table is all citizens and have been permanent residents of the country for many 
years. There is also a substantial educational gap between the groups. Citizens with a higher 
education make up 39 percent of the core voters and only 11 percent of the abstainers. Furthermore, 
there is a large gap in terms of income with core voters earning 52 percent more than abstainers. We 
also see a higher share of women in the core group than in the abstainer group. 
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Table 3: Demographic characteristics of abstainers, peripheral, and core voters 
 Female 
(share, %) 
Age  
(mean, 
years) 
Non-
Western 
background 
(share, %) 
Higher 
education 
(share, %) 
Yearly 
income 
(DKK) 
N 
Abstainer (0/3) 46.6 47.5 12.4 11.1 236,215 194,484 
Peripheral (1/3) 49.7 44.5 7.4 19.4 284,654 293,808 
Peripheral (2/3) 52.2 48.0 3.7 26.9 319,618 534,209 
Core voter (3/3) 52.1 53.2 1.3 39.4 359,131 1,071,295 
Mean 51.3 50.1 3.8 30.8 327,182 2,093,796 
Note: All demographic information is from the time of the 2015 election. Non-Western background 
refers to immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries, a category defined by Statistics 
Denmark7. Higher education consists of citizens who have completed either a higher education 
(e.g., school teachers) or a college education. The large sample size implies that even very small 
differences are statistically significant. 
 
In table A1 in the appendix, we show three regression analyses with cumulative participation 
as the dependent variable and the variables in table 3 as independent variables alongside with other 
control variables and municipality fixed effects. These analyses are in line with the results in table 3 
and confirm most of the predictions. Though we in no way claim causal relationships, we can 
conclude that over three elections gender, age, income, ethnicity and educational attainment are 
strong indicators of voting. We think this an important descriptive finding also in the light of 
increased immigration to Western Europe in the recent years and the possible consequence for 
future turnout. 
 
The predictors of turnout in different types of elections 
So far we have shown that sociodemographic variables predict cumulative voting. A related 
question is if the law of dispersion applies. To investigate this, we now turn to studying each of the 
7 Individuals are classified as native Danes if at least one parent was born in Denmark and holds 
Danish citizenship, irrespective of whether the individuals were born in Denmark and/or hold 
Danish citizenship themselves. Individuals who do not meet these criteria are, following Statistics 
Denmark, considered either immigrants (if they were born outside Denmark) or descendants (if 
their parents were born outside Denmark). 
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elections independently. Below, we compare how different sociodemographic variables predict 
turnout across our three types of elections. Are the predictors stronger in elections with lower 
turnout as the law would suggest? We conduct three regression analyses using the same covariates. 
For each regression, we switch the dependent variable to be turnout in each of our election years in 
turn. That way, we learn how strong predictors each of our variables of interest are of turnout in 
each of the elections. For each of the elections, we conduct a regression analysis including the same 
variables as in the analysis of cumulative participation including municipality-level fixed effects. 
We present the average marginal differences for our variables of interest based on figure 1 and 
show the complete models in the appendix. 
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Figure 1: The average marginal difference on voter turnout in three elections 
 
 
Note: The average marginal difference in turnout of the mentioned variables on turnout compared with their relevant reference group, 
which is non-Western ethnicity for ethnicity and primary school for education. For instance, all-else-equal, females vote 2.8 percentage 
points more than males in local elections in 2013. See table A2 in the appendix for complete models including standard errors. 
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Figure 1 shows that the turnout gap tends to be smallest in the high-turnout national elections 
for all groups except for the gender differences, where the gap is nonexistent in the European 
elections, and for differences between voters with a non-Western background and the two other 
groups. Compared to ethnic Danes, the difference is practically the same in local and national 
elections. Compared to voters with a Western background, the difference is smaller in local 
elections than in the national election. Especially in the European elections and with respect to 
education, in general, the law of dispersion holds firm: In the elections with the lowest turnout rates, 
the differences between subgroups of the electorate are large. The picture is particularly interesting 
for two groups. First, the ethnic groups’ participation differs a lot, and ethnic Danes participate 
much more than immigrants and descendants of both Western and non-Western background. The 
average difference between ethnic Danes and citizens with a non-Western background is around 25-
26 percentage points in both the local and national elections. In the lower turnout European 
election, the corresponding number is 32 percentage points. For the Western group, the differences 
are smaller, and the turnout gap is, in fact, a bit smaller in the local than in the national elections. 
Thus, with the Western group, the pattern does not completely follow the law of dispersion. 
Second, the education gap is striking. Compared to people with a primary school education, 
the positive average marginal effect of being higher educated is substantial across all educational 
categories. Furthermore, the average marginal effect of more education on turnout is considerably 
larger in local elections and in particular in the European elections. For instance, the average 
marginal difference in turnout between those having completed more than five years of higher 
education and those having completed only elementary school is 16 percentage points in the 
national election, 22 percentage points in the local election 2013, and 33 percentage points in the 
European election. It seems that the image of the European Union being a project that appeals 
primarily to the highly educated citizens is a somewhat fair picture. 
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Additional evidence: Investigating the law of dispersion across municipalities 
So far, we have analyzed the law of dispersion by comparing the turnout gap for the same voters in 
three different types of elections with varying levels of overall turnout. Though the analyses have 
been consistent with the theory, a potential challenge to the analysis is that it could be differences 
regarding the types of elections that explain the increasing gap in turnout at the European and local 
elections compared to the national election. 
Local elections provide us with an opportunity to investigate whether the size of the turnout 
gap remains related to the aggregate turnout when the voters are different, but the elections are 
similar. In Danish local elections, turnout varies substantially between the municipalities, ranging 
from 61.2 percent in Copenhagen to more than 80 percent in some municipalities. While each 
municipality has its particular political agenda and election dynamics, the local elections are, in 
general terms, similar for the citizens. No matter where the voters live, they vote for a politician or 
party to represent them in local politics, and the parties are, for the most part, the same national 
parties.  
In figure 2 (left panel), we plot the difference in turnout between citizens with the lowest level 
of education and the highest level of education in 95 municipalities in the 2013 local elections.8 The 
municipality-specific difference is from a hierarchical Bayesian model with municipality-specific 
coefficients for education, ethnicity, and gender.9 The same individual-level control variable as in 
8 We exclude the three small municipalities of Læsø, Ærø, and Samsø as they each have too few 
citizens with either a non-Western ethnic background or a higher education to conduct the analysis. 
9 Some municipalities have few voters in some categories, which mean that if few voters for some 
arbitrary reason vote/abstain, they could have a great impact on the cross-municipality estimates. 
When we fit a Bayesian hierarchical with non-informative priors, the municipality-specific effects 
are sampled from the same overarching distribution. This way, the estimates become a compromise 
between the strength of the signal of the municipality-specific effects and the precision of the 
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figure 1 is included. As the trend line shows, the educational gap in turnout is negatively related to 
aggregate turnout. In the right panel, we get the same picture when comparing citizens with an 
ethnic Danish background to citizens with a non-Western ethnic background. 
 
Figure 2: Turnout gap at different levels of turnout in the local elections 2013 
Note: The left panel shows the relationship between turnout and the difference in turnout between voters with a high 
education and voters with no education beyond public school. The dots are point estimates of the differences from the 
Bayesian hierarchical model with 95% credible intervals. The dashed black line shows the relationship when estimated 
as an ordinary least square regression (OLS). The solid grey line shows the relationship from a regression where the 
points are weighted by their precision. The right panel shows the relationship between turnout and the difference in 
turnout between voters with a non-Western background and an ethnic Danish background. 
While the differences implied by the trend lines at a glance might seem small, they are not 
trivial. For instance, when turnout is one percentage point higher, the educational gap is predicted to 
overarching prediction of municipality effects. In other words, the Bayesian model reduces the risk 
that we make inferences based on outliers from small municipalities with weak signals. 
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be 0.4 percentage points lower. Likewise, each one percentage point increase in turnout is 
associated with a 0.3 percentage points drop for the predicted turnout gap between citizens with an 
ethnic Danish background and a non-Western ethnic background. The analysis does not change 
substantially if we weight by the precision of the municipality differences (see appendix table A3 
for regression tables). Overall, the declining turnout gap illustrated in figure 2 is consistent with the 
analysis in figure 1. This finding shows that when we compare different voters over similar 
elections we arrive at the same conclusion as when we compare the same voters over different 
elections: As predicted by the law of dispersion, tower rates of turnout are related to higher 
differences in turnout between social groups. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
We have explored what predicts cumulative turnout and what characterizes those who always and 
never vote. So far, little empirical attention has been given to cumulative turnout outside the U.S., 
and the existing research often suffers from having access to only few variables and in many cases 
just self-reported turnout. Using validated turnout and highly reliable register-based background 
information from a panel of 2.1 million Danish citizens across three elections, we add important 
empirical knowledge about turnout patterns across elections. Our analyses show that in the Danish 
high-turnout context, around 51 percent of the citizens are core voters and around 40 percent enter 
and exit the electorate from election to election. The share of core voters is markedly larger than in 
lower-turnout countries like the US and Switzerland. On the other hand, more than nine percent 
abstain at every election across consecutive elections. This is quite remarkable since voting in this 
context is a very easy and low-cost act to do, and the norm of voting is extremely strong in 
Denmark. When citizens do not even manage to vote here, it is quite likely that they also abstain 
22 
 
from participating in other forms of political and societal activities (cf. Stolle & Hooghe 2005; 
Pattie et al. 2003), although we emphasize that this is a topic for future research, and here we have 
not offered empirical support for this proposition. Indeed, one might wonder how they can be 
mobilized to take part in elections. 
The abstainers did not vote in any of the three consecutive elections, that is, this group did not 
engage at all with the social contract of representative democracy. These eligible non-voters are 
dominated by relatively many non-native Danes and many with low levels of education. It is 
worrisome that almost one-tenth of the electorate simply does not give their support to the core of 
representative democracy by failing to participate in elections. There might be many less troubling 
reasons to miss a single election, but missing three consecutive elections signifies that a share of the 
public consistently has no wish to participate. It is not only worth monitoring the size of the group 
in future elections but also to engage in mobilization efforts to provide the best opportunities for 
this group of habitual non-voters to become familiar with democracy. 
The law of dispersion provides a good framework to understand cumulative turnout and what 
characterizes core voters, irregular voters, and abstainers. According to Tingsten’s (1937) law of 
dispersion, the general rule is that voting frequencies rise with rising social status and that the 
differences in turnout are lower the higher the general turnout is (Lijphart 1997). Or put differently 
the higher the salience of the election, the more equal is the participation across social demographic 
factors and vice versa. Our findings suggest that rather than irregular voters being a special category 
of voters, propensity to drop out is a linear function of the salience of the election. In order words, 
irregular voters can be seen as somewhere between abstainers and core voters. In this sense the 
abstainers do not seem to have unique characteristics, but are instead voters that on average are 
more likely to be men, have less education, and are less likely to be ethnic Danes, which suggest 
that is possible to mobilize them specially in high salience election. 
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For cumulative participation, we can use the logic of the law to pose the question whether the 
differences in voter participation for various sociodemographic groups are larger when the number 
of consecutive elections in which they have participated declines. Looking at the composition of the 
groups, we learn that a substantial share of the core voters have finished a higher education, have a 
higher income, and are less likely to have a non-Western background. The opposite is the case for 
the abstainers, where there is a substantial overrepresentation of citizens with a non-Western 
background and with less education. From a model with background variables, we learn that ethnic 
background and educational attainment are strongly correlated with cumulative participation. 
Higher educated and ethnic Danes are more likely to participate in multiple elections. Thus, the 
inequality across sociodemographic groups that single-election studies often find also holds firm for 
cumulative turnout. 
In the final part of our analysis, we applied the law of dispersion in a more traditional way and 
looked at the predictors of turnout in each of the elections to find out whether the difference in 
turnout between different sociodemographic groups varies across election type. In a context where 
turnout varies from 56.3 percent in the European Parliament election over 71.9 percent in the local 
elections to 85.9 percent in the national election, our analysis mostly confirms the law of dispersion 
but adds some new nuances. Regarding ethnic background, the difference between the group least 
likely to vote, voters with a non-Western background, and the group most likely to vote, ethnic 
Danes, is largest in the European election but practically equivalent in the local and the national 
elections. Compared to voters with a Western background, voters with non-Western background fall 
further behind in the national election than in the local elections. For education, the law of 
dispersion holds firm. This also means that peripheral voters mainly drop out of second order 
elections, but are more mobilized in first order elections. 
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The findings are sobering for those who, like Mr. Verhofstadt in our introductory quote, care 
about the representativeness of the voters in the European elections. Education strongly predicts 
turnout in the European elections, as does ethnicity. Thus, as the law of dispersion would predict, 
European elections seem to be the least representative of the general population of voters. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: The predictors of cumulative participation (OLS regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.057* 
(0.001) 
0.050* 
(0.001) 
0.057* 
(0.001) 
Age -4.880* 
(0.085) 
-12.446* 
(0.097) 
-13.044* 
(0.099) 
Age2 1.602* 
(0.017) 
2.975* 
(0.019) 
3.074* 
(0.019) 
Age3 -0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.000) 
Ethnic background (base=Danish)    
Western ethnicity -0.229* 
(0.007) 
-0.282* 
(0.007) 
-0.275* 
(0.007) 
Non-Western ethnicity -0.879* 
(0.004) 
-0.805* 
(0.004) 
-0.854* 
(0.004) 
Education (base = elementary school)     
High school   0.440* 
(0.003) 
0.430* 
(0.003) 
Technical education   0.294* 
(0.002) 
0.271* 
(0.002) 
Higher education (4 years or less)   0.605* 
(0.002) 
0.570* 
(0.002) 
Higher education (5 years or less)   0.785* 
(0.003) 
0.729* 
(0.003) 
Income (million DKK)   0.012 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.004) 
No public benefits (full time employed)   0.071* 
(0.002) 
0.032* 
(0.002) 
Living with others     0.264* 
(0.002) 
Living with children under 26 years     0.170* 
(0.002) 
Constant 2.267* 
(0.013) 
3.008* 
(0.015) 
2.901* 
(0.015) 
Observations 2,093,796 2,093,796 2,093,796 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.144 0.165 
Note: OLS regression with municipality-level fixed effects. * p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is number of elections participated in and ranges from 0 to 3. 
Independent variables are from the time of the 2015 election. Ethnicity refers to country of birth and 
parents’ descent. Multinomial logit regressions provide results consistent with OLS results. The 
results from the multinomial logit shows that voting once, twice, three times, and in all four 
elections aligns in fairly equal distances, which is an assumption when we use OLS.  
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Table A2: The predictors of voter turnout in three elections (OLS regression) 
 2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
Female 0.028* 
(0.001) 
0.006* 
(0.001) 
0.026* 
(0.000) 
Age / 100 -4.957* 
(0.042) 
-5.398* 
(0.045) 
-3.080* 
(0.039) 
Age2 /100 0.115* 
(0.001) 
0.127* 
(0.001) 
0.722* 
(0.008) 
Age3 /100 -0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
Ethnicity (base = non-Western)    
Danish ethnicity 0.259* 
(0.002) 
0.322* 
(0.002) 
0.265* 
(0.002) 
Western ethnicity 0.156* 
(0.004) 
0.239* 
(0.004) 
0.183* 
(0.003) 
Education, completed (base=Primary school    
High school 0.134* 
(0.001) 
0.173* 
(0.001) 
0.126* 
(0.001) 
Technical education 0.090* 
(0.001) 
0.093* 
(0.001) 
0.085* 
(0.001) 
Higher education (4 years or less) 0.184* 
(0.001) 
0.238* 
(0.001) 
0.141* 
(0.001) 
Higher education (5 years or more) 0.219* 
(0.001) 
0.332* 
(0.001) 
0.158* 
(0.001) 
No public benefits -0.005* 
(0.001) 
-0.005* 
(0.001) 
0.009* 
(0.001) 
Living with others 0.103* 
(0.001) 
0.091* 
(0.001) 
0.077* 
(0.001) 
Children under 26 years living at home 0.087* 
(0.001) 
0.026* 
(0.001) 
0.045* 
(0.001) 
Income (logged) 0.010* 
(0.000) 
0.008* 
(0.000) 
0.017* 
(0.000) 
N 2,093,796 2,093,796 2,093,796 
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.114 0.098 
Note: * p < 0.001. Municipality fixed effects are included in all models. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Binary logit regressions provide results consistent with OLS results. 
  
30 
 
Table A3: Change in turnout gap when turnout increases (OLS regression) 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Education:  
Primary school  
higher education 
Ethnic background: 
Danish   
Non-western 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Turnout -0.393 -0.535 -0.308 -0.447 
 
(-0.096) (-0.092) (-0.219) (-0.176) 
Constant 45.551 56.713 47.07 57.799 
 
(-7.296) (-6.937) (-16.581) (-13.116) 
Weight included? NO YES NO YES 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R2 0.152 0.266 0.021 0.064 
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.258 0.01 0.054 
Residual Std. Error (df = 93) 3.286 0.917 7.467 1.778 
F Statistic (df = 1; 93)  16.611 33.647 1.981 6.407 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The models can be interpreted as the change in turnout 
difference for the mentioned groups when aggregate turnout increases by one percentage point. For 
instance, when turnout increases by one percentage point, the turnout gap between citizens with 
primary school and higher education decreases with -0.393 percentage points. As is visible from 
figure 2, some municipalities have wider confidence intervals than others, for example because of 
fewer citizens and few observations in one of the categories in the analysis. The weighted models 
take this precision of the municipality differences into account (i.e., municipalities vary in 
population size). 
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